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policy: Samuel v. Oliver (Ill.), 22 N. E. Rep. 499; Sampson
v. Shaw, IOI Mass. 145.
An agreement by which one guarantees to another that
cattle to be sold by the latter shall bring so much a.head,
binding himself to pay the difference if they bring less, while
the owner agrees to pay the difference to the guarantor in case
they bring more, is a .wager on the price of the cattle, and a
note given for such difference is void: Bank v. Carroll,
89 Iowa, II; S. C., 45 N. W. Rep. 304.
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DICKSON V. WALDRON. 1  SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.
The.manager of a tleatre is responsible for the acts of a special police
who vas appointed for the theatre, at the special request of the manager,
by the Board of Metropolitan Police Commissioners, and who was
employed and paid solely by such manager: 34 N. B. Rep. 506, affirmed.
The manager is liable for an assault and batteiy on an offensive patron
by the special police, when acting as doorkeeper, since such act was
within the scope of his employment in his mastr-r's business: 34 N. B.
Rep. 506, affirmed.
LIABILITY OF A THEATRE MANAGER FOR ASSAULT COMMITTED
BY A SPECIAL POLICEMAN.
The liability of a master for an assault and battery com-
mitted by his servant is based on the common law principle
" Qui fani per aluin facit per se," the theory being that the
master in selecting his servants must do so with prudence and
caution, and must select persons capable of fulfilling the duties
'Reported in 35 N. E. Rep. 1, NOV. 24, 1893.
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he will exact under penalty of his personal responsibility for
their torts.
This theory has been greatly modified in modem jurispru-
dence, until to-day the true criterion of the master's liability is-
embodied in the answer to the question, "Is the act com-
plained of within the scope of the servant's authority ?" If so,
the master is liable; othenvise, not.
The test, as laid down by Cooley, is "not the motive of the
servant, but whether that which he did was something which
his employment contemplated, and something which, if he
should do it lawfully, he might do in the employer's name:"
Torts, 536. The great difficulty in applying this principle lies
in defining what acts properly fall within the scope of the ser-
vant's employment. In the case of Ware v. Barataria, 15 La.
169, it was held that where an agent lost sight of the object
for which he was employed and committed a wrong, thereby
causing damage, the principal was no more answerable for it
than any stranger, the agent in such case acting of his own
will, and not in- the course of his employment, or under any
implied authority of his principal. The duty of defendant's
servant in this case was to open and close certain river locks
and collezt tolls, and the offence complained of by plaintiff was.
an assault and battery received by him from defendant's ser-
vant under pretext of said plaintiff not having paid his toll.
This ruling was followed in the subsequent case of Block v..
Bannerman, io La. Ann. i, where the owner of a vessel was
held liable for the tortious acts of the master, committed whilst.
in his service and within the scope of his authority.
The principleis true even if the tort be committed in dis-
obedience to the master's orders: R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How.
468. In a comparatively recent case, the Supreme Court of'
Louisiana decided that plaintiff could not recover damages
against the master for a wanton and unprovoked assault:
inflicted on him by defendant's servant,, the plaintiff being a
passenger on a train to which a Pullman Palace Car was
attached, of which defendant's 'servant was porter, and having
entered the palace car to ask permission to wash his hands-
The court held that the assault was something which the ser-
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vant's employment did not contemplate, and was not, therefore,
within its scope: Williams v. Palace Car Co., 4o La. Ann. 87.
In the case of Turner v. Western, etc., R. R. Co., 72 Ga.
292, it ivas held that where one was lawfully in the cab of the
freight train of a railroad treating for his. passage, as had fre-
quently been done, and was still being done at times of trial by
other persons on the same train, as to an injury inflicted upon
him -he stands within the reason and spirit of the authorities in
reference to like injuries done to passengers.
"The general doctrine with reference to master aid servant,
employer and employee, is, that when Ithe employee commit-
ting the injury is not at the time executing the. employer's
business or not acting within the scope of his employment the
employer is not responsible:" Pryor, C. J., in Winnegar's
Admr. v. R . R. Co., 85 K y. 547.
In McKinley v. The C. & N. W. R. R *Co., 44 Iowa, 3 14,
an action was brought to recover damages for an assault by
defendant's brakeman on plaintiff while latter was attempting
to enter a passenger car at Howard Junction, Wisconsin, on
March 22, 1872. Seevers' C. J., delivering the opinion, said:
"If we were left to determine the question upon principle,
whether an employer should be held liable for the wilful or
criminal acts of the employee done in the course of his
employment, we should have very little or no hesitation
in affirming such liability, and this because the employer,has
placed the employee in a position to do wrong, and it being
done in the course of his employment, the intent with which
it was done should not affect the 'liability of the employer
whether the intent of the employee is good 'or ill. So long
as he acts within the scope of his employment the employer
should be bound. The decided weight and number of the
authorities are in accord with this view. We need only refer
'to some of them without stopping to discuss or review them."
See Turner v. North Branch R. R. Co., 4 Cal. 494; G. West-
ern R. R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Finney v. R. R. Co.,
io Wis. 395; Brooks v. Penna. Cent. R. R. Co., 57 Pa. 339;
St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353; -R. R. Co. v.
Wetmore, 19 Ohio, no; Isaacs v. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 122;
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Goddard -. Grand Trunk R. R.,Co., 57 Mich. 212; Rich v-.
Bryant, io6 Mass. i8o; Cracker v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co.,
36 Wis. 657.
"A railroad corporation is liable to the same extent as an
individual would be for an injury done by its. servant in the
course of his employment: Moore v. R. R. C0., 4 Gray, 465;
Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen, 420; Holmes v. Wakefield,
12 Allen, 580. If the act of the servant is within the general
scope of his employment, the master is equally liable whether
the act is wilful or merely negligent: Howe v. Newmarch,
12 Allen, 49. Or even if it is contrary to an expressed order
of the master: R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468. . . . We
deem it unnecessary to cite further authorities on this point.
The principle lying at the foundation of the doctrine is as old
as the common law, and is embodied in the maxim qui facit
per alui tfacitper se, and is as applicable to corporations as to
individuals. Doubtless, if a servant or agent commit a tort
out of the scope of his agency or employment and not con-
nected with it, the principle would not be liable therefor unless
he previously authorized or subsequently ratified the act: "
Ramsden v. R. R. Co., 1o4 Mass. I 17. Where a servant in
the employment of his master does an act which he is not
employed to do the master is not responsible: Towanda Coal
Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418. A master is liable for the results
of the wilful conduct of his servant if within the scope of his
authority, or for acts done by his command or with his assent:
R. R. Co. 2,. Wilt, 4 Whart. 142; Yerger et ux. v. Warren,
7 Casey, 319; R. R. Co. v. McLain, 91 Pa. 442; Ry. Co. v.
Donahue, 70 Pa. I i9; Higgins v. Turnpike Co., 46 N. Y. 23.
A corporation is liable for the wilful acts and torts of its
servants done to the injury of others, within the general scope
of their employment: Terre Haute. etc., R. R. Co. v. Jackson,
81 Ind. 19; Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind.
116; Express Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430; Wabash Ry. Co.
v. Savage, I IO Ind. i56; Ry. Co. -'. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183.
The act of the agent within the general scope of his
employment is the act of the master, and if wrongful the
master is liable, although the act be unnecessary to the per-
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formance of the master's service and was not intended for that
purpose- The liability of the master does not depend upon
the necessity of- the act, or the intent with which it was done,
but upon whether the act was wrongful and within the general
scope of the employment of the agent: Indianapolis, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183.
In Noblesville, etc, v. Gause, 76 Ind. 142, it is said:
"Counsel have cited cases declaring the familiar rule that a
master is responsible for the acts of the servant, only when
the latter is acting within the scope of his employinent ; but
this was an unnecessary work, for the general rule is too well
settled and understood to need support from adjudged cases."
If a servant does a wrongful act without the authority, and
not for the purpose of executing the orders or doing the work
of his master, the latter is not resp6nsible therefor; but if the
act be done in the execution of the auth6rity given by the
master and for the purpose of performing, what he has
directed, he is responsible whether the wrong done be occa-
sioned by negligence or by a wanton and reckless purpose to
accomplish his business in an unlawful manner: Howe v.
Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49.
By the civil law the liability was confined to the person
standing in the relation of paterfamilias to the wrongdoer:
Dig, lib. 9, tit. 3- But by the English law the liability is
more extensive.
In McManus v. Crickett, I East. io6, Lord Kenyon, C. J.,
after quoting Chief Justice Holt in Middleton v. Fowler, Salk.
282, to the effect, "that no master is'chargeable with the acts
of his servant, but when he acts in te" execution of the
authority given him," says: "Now, when a servant quits
sight of the object for Which he is employed, and without
having in view his master's order, pursues that which his own
inalice suggests, he no longer acts in pursuance of the author-
ity given him, and, according to the doctrine of Lord Holt,
his master will not be answerable for such act." See Turber-
ville v..Stamp, I Ld. Ray, 264.
A master, however, is not responsible for the wrongful act
of his servant unless that act be done in the execution of the
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authority given by his master- Be'jond the scope of his emiploy-
ment he is as much a stranger to his master as any third
person, and therefore his act cannot be regarded as the act of
his master: Lamb v. Palk, 9 C. & P. 629; Garth v. Howard,
8 Bing. 451; Wilson. v. Rankin, 34 L. J., Q. B., 62;
McGowan v. Dyer, L. R., 8 Q. B. 1I.
A master is liabre'for injury caused by the wanton and
violent conduct of his servant in the performance of an act
within the course of his employment: Seymour v. Green-
wood, 7 H. & H. 356; Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590;
Limpus v. Omnibus Co., I H. & C. 526; and such act only
binds when done by the authority or consent of the master:
Ward v. Evans, 2 Salk. 441; Lyons v. Martin, 8 Ad. & E.
512 ; Gregory v. Pipe, 9 B. & C. 591.
In Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234, Thayer, P.'J., instructed
the jury that "the defendant is responsible for any loss or
damage suffered by himself in consequence of the misconduct
of the defendant's agents. It did not require an express direc-
tion to her agents to commit this injury to make her respon-
sible." The instruction was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
the facts in this case being almost identical with those of
Dickson v. Waldron.
The following quotations are taken from the celebrated
Doctor Fraser's work on the Scottish law of Master and Ser-
vant, as illustrative of the question in that country -
" Quasi delicts have been defined by the Roman jurist,
facta illicita sola culpa sine dolo admissa. They are acts which
arise from carelessness, negligence, rashness, or want of skill,
by which injury has been sustained, without any criminal
intention on the part of the doer.
"If a servant does a wrongful act without the authority, and
not for the purpose of executing the orders or doing the work
of the master, the latter is not responsible in damages therefor;
but if the act be done in the execution of the authority given
by the master, and for the purpose of performing what he has
directed, he is responsible whether the wrong done be
occasioned by negligence, or by a wanton and reckless purpose
to accomplish his business in an unlawful manner.
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"The liability of the master for the servant's quasi delicts
rests partly on the same principle with his liability for his
servant's contracts :-viz., that expressed in the maxim, qui
facitper afiumfaci tper se,-partly on views of expediency, and
partly also on the following grounds: The master is presumed
to select the servant from a knowledge of, or at least a belief
in his skill, steadiness,'and care. He places him in a position
in which he acquires a relation to the public which he would
not otherwise hold,-a position entailing responsibilities which,
but for their being thus delegated to another, the master would
have to discharge for himself. Also, he entrusts him with the
charge of property often calling for carefulness in its manage-
ment, to. avoid accident to others;. and thus puts it in his
power, by carelessness or rashness, to inflict injury on others
to an extent that would not otherwise exist. For these and
similar reasons the laws of most countries have sanctioned a
departure, where the relatibn of master and. servant exists,
from the general principle, cupla tenet suos auctores. Page 150.
"First, it may be observed that the master is of course liable
to answer for any injury caused by the servant in the direct
execution of his express orders. With regard to this class of
cases there is no difficulty; the connection between the wrong
and the authority from which the act flowed is immediate, and
sufficiently obvious.
"But, secondly, it falls to be remarked that, to make ,the
master liable, no such immediate connection between his
command and the act out of which the .injury results is
requisite. It is sufficient, in order to entail such, responsibility
on the master, that the servant was at tile time acting under
the general mandate implied in his contract of service-thathe
was doing his master's work, or even that he was at the time
employed in an operation which might fairly be held to fall
within the scope and sphere of his duties as servant, even
though the master may have been utterly ignorant that his
servant was engaged in that particular duty at the time.
"Two well marked exceptions to, or rather limitations of
the rule, are to be noticed as now well settled by a series of
decisions.
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"The fii:'t of these is, that the rule only applies where the
injury cau-:d by the servant, for which it is sought to make
the master answerable, arises out of something done by him
while acting- strictly within the scope and limits of his employ-
ment while discharging the duties for which he has been
engaged under his contract with his master. The reason of
this exception is, that the master's liability, having its origin in
implied mandate, can have no place where the limits of that
mandate ate exceeded.
"The second exception is, that the rule applies only where
the relation of master and servant exists in a strict and proper
sense between the offending party and him whom it is sought
to make responsible for the act. Where this is not the case,
there is no room for applying the maxim, respondeat siperior."
Page 151.
"The rule which is now established is, to quote the words
of Willes, J., in Barwick v. The English Joint Stock Bank-an
action against a bank for fraudulent misrepresentation on the
part of its manager-' that the master is answerable for every
such wrong of the servant or agent as is comiitted in the
course of the service and for the master's benefit, though no
express command or privity of the master be proved:'"
Macdonell, Master and Servt. 258.
"A master is liable for the wrongful act of his servant, to
the injury of a third person, where the servant is engaged at
the time in doing his master's business, and is acting within
the general scope of his authority, although he is reckless in
the performance of his duty, or through lack of judgment or
discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence
of passion aroused by the circumstances, goes beyond the strict
line of his duty, and inflicts unnecessary and unjustifiable
injury:" Wood, Mast. and Servt. (2d Ed.) 589.
A master is liable for the act of his servant done in the
course of his employment: Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esq. 72.
As to the servant's tort and negligence, the universal rule
is, that the master is responsible in damages to third persons
for the act of his servant occasioning an injury, whether the
act is of omission or commission, in conformity to or in
456 LIABILITY OF A THEATRE MANAGER FOR ASSAULT
disobedience of the master's order, by negligence, fraud, deceit,
or even wilful misconduct so long as it was in the course
of the employment: Browne, Dom. Rel. 136.
The master is not liable for a wrongful, wilful, and unlawful,
act of his servant toward a third person, although the servant
professes to be acting in the master's employment, if the act
is entirely independent and outside of and having no proper
,connection with the employment: Browne, Dom. Rel. 138.
A master is ordinarily liable to answer in a civil suit for the
tortious or wrongful acts of his servants if those acts are done
.in the course of his employment in his master's service. The
*maxims applicable to such cases being respondeat superior and
,quifacit per alium, facit per se: Smith, Master and Servant, 322.
This rule is universal in its application and whether the act
be negligent, fraudulent or deceitful, or even an act of positive
malfeasance or misconduct, if done in the course of his em-
ployment, the master is responsible ciiliter to-third persons:
Story, on Agency, 452; Paley, on Agency, 294; Pothier, on
•Oblig. (Evans) 456.
In conclusion, I will cit the following rule laid down by the
-eminent Judge Cooley, cited with approval by the Supreme
'Court of Louisiana in the case of Williams v. Palace Car Co.,
supra: " It will readily occur to every mind that the master
cannot, in reason, be held responsible generally for whatever
-wrongful conduct a servant may be guilty of. A . liability, so
-extensive would make him guarantor of the servant's good
-conduct, and would put him under a responsibility, which
prudent men would hesitate to assume.
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